We make a case for price-increasing competition on "competitive bottleneck" two-sided markets. Unlike previous literature on price-increasing competition and two-sided markets, we abstract from product/platform differentiation, structural differences, scale effects, search costs, and capacity constraints, which would per se favor the one or the other market structure. We argue that demand interrelation as given on many competitive bottleneck twosided markets might be sufficient to cause either no observable price effect of competition or price-increasing competition under certain conditions. We derive these conditions and illustrate the economic intuition. Under price equality, virtually everything except for the number of platform operators is identical in monopoly and duopoly. Nevertheless, total demand on both market sides in the duopoly market exceeds total demand in the monopoly market. Furthermore, even though there is no observable price effect, there is still a competitive effect that becomes manifest in total duopoly equilibrium profits being strictly smaller than monopoly profits. The relationship of total welfare is ambiguous in subsidization cases, while it is strictly greater in duopoly, if no subsidization takes place.
Introduction
When teaching students the basic insights of microeconomics, most economists claim that competition decreases prices and increases welfare as compared to a monopoly market. This standard view of the relationship of competition and prices is further deepened when teaching the standard Bertrand-model of duopolistic competition, i.e. when claiming that price competition among two firms is sufficient to create perfect competition. But is it really that clear, easy, and straightforward? A number of theoretical contributions present models that predict the opposite effect. This literature basically argues that product differentiation or search costs may lead to price-increasing competition. We argue that the "two-sidedness" of markets might also be an explanation for this phenomenon without relying on product differentiation or the like.
The economic literature on two-sided markets studies markets in which intermediary services, called "platforms", facilitate interaction between distinct and distinguishable groups of agents, called "market sides". The distinct feature of these platform industries is that each market side's utility from joining a platform is affected by the platform's diffusion on the other market side. In other words, each agent's decision to join or not to join a platform exerts an externality on agents on the other market side (Rochet and Tirole (2003) ). We assume a "competitive bottleneck" two-sided market (Armstrong (2006) ) and argue that under specific conditions there is a demand-enhancing effect of competition on the single-homing market side, which drives prices upwards. On the other hand, platform competition has the opposite effect on prices. We show that it is possible that the latter effect does not fully compensate the former effect, which either causes no observable price effect or price-increasing competition.
To focus solely on the effects of the two-sidedness, we neither allow for platform differentiation, nor do we impose structural differences in terms of costs, scale effects or capacity constraints that might per se favor the one or the other market structure.
The question of price changes with regard to market structure becomes relevant when policy makers consider subsidies in order to attract new entrants to given monopoly markets.
Reversely, antitrust authorities need to assess the impact of mergers on prices. A positive correlation of price and market concentration is also the fundamental assumption of the empirical price-concentration literature that aims at measuring the price effect of market concentration.
The paper is constructed as follows: After briefly reviewing the relevant literature, we develop a monopoly model and derive the monopolist's optimal pricing policy. In Section 4, we suggest a model of duopolistic competition that is founded on the same assumptions as the 3 monopoly model, thus being fully comparable. In Section 5, we compare the equilibrium outcome in duopoly and the monopolist's optimum. In Section 6 we illustrate our main propositions using numerical examples. Finally, we conclude and highlight some implications of our findings in Section 7.
Literature Review
The term "two-sided" or "multi-sided market" describes a situation in which two or more distinct and distinguishable groups of agents interact via an intermediary. This intermediary, usually called "platform", charges all groups per transaction and/or for platform access, thereby determining total transaction costs (Rochet and Tirole (2006) ). Agents may or may not obtain intrinsic utility from joining a platform. More importantly, demand of one market side affects the utility the other market side obtains from joining a platform. The platform therefore needs "to get both sides on board" (Rochet and Tirole (2003) ). Generally, it is hard to draw conclusions from general formulations of two-sided market models, because a number of contradicting assumptions seem plausible, depending on the context. In Rochet and Tirole (2003) 's credit card example, the number of retailers connected to a specific credit card network, positively affects the utility of consumers, who wish to pay using this credit card and vice versa. In media economics two-sidedness is present in the relation of the media provider, media consumers, and advertisers. However, unlike in the credit card example, most theoretical models assume that media consumers wish to consume the media content only, and are "coerced" to consume advertising as well (see e.g. Anderson and Coate (2005) , Gabszewicz et al. (2004), Gal-Or and Dukes (2003) , Peitz and Valletti (2008)) 1 .
Empirical results support this "ad-aversion" assumption for television viewers (see e.g. Danaher (1995) , Wilbur (2007) ), but find "ad-liking" for print media (Kaiser and Song (2009), Rysman (2004) ).
Credit cards and media products also serve as an example to illustrate a second crucial aspect:
Excludability of agents who are not willing to pay. While a credit card service can refuse to accommodate specific consumers and retailers, and therefore charge both market sides for its services, media consumers cannot be excluded from free-to-air broadcasting services, so they cannot be charged for consuming it (see the seminal paper by Anderson and Coate (2005) ).
Third, credit cards are goods that allow for joint consumption or "multi-homing" as it is called in the two-sided market literature. That is, consumers are able to own more than one credit card and retailers can accept more than one card, while in media applications 4 consumers are often assumed to single-home, e.g. a moviegoer has to decide for exactly one cinema on a Saturday night, but a firm can place advertisements in more than one movie theater.
These selected aspects illustrate, why literature on two-sided markets tailors models around specific examples. For instance, Armstrong (2006) gives a media economic example in his seminal study of pricing in a "competitive bottleneck" scenario. A "competitive bottleneck" is a two-sided market in which one market side is restricted to single-homing, while the other market side is able to multi-home. Armstrong (2006) derives optimal pricing rules for monopoly and duopoly markets in terms of elasticities and finds that there is no difference in advertising prices between monopolies and oligopolies. He argues that competition only emerges on the market for media consumers: Media providers compete for consumers, since advertisers' demand depends on the number of consumers that are exposed to the advertisement, and consumers -by assumption-need to single-home. However, media providers are still monopolists when providing their consumers' attention to the advertiser, because a specific consumer can only be reached by advertising with the platform this consumer chose. If the advertisers' willingness to pay is sufficiently high, the platform might reduce its prices for consumers even below marginal costs, i.e. it "subsidizes" consumers out of advertising revenues.
Counter-intuitive price effects with regard to competition on a competitive bottleneck duopoly have already been reported by Chandra and Collard-Wexlar (2009) . They compare pricing under duopolistic competition and joint management of two platforms. Similar to our paper, they find that under specific conditions a merger might lead to a price decrease instead of a price increase. However, their argument and setting is completely different than ours. In their model, platforms can exert negative externalities on each other's profit by increasing their prices. Under joint management this externality would be internalized, which might result in lower monopoly prices. The basic economic effect in their model is analog to the well-known effects occurring when merging two firms with complementary products on a traditional one-sided market.
Price-increasing competition on one-sided markets has also been reported as the result of product differentiation (see Chen and Riordan (2008) , Melzer and Morgan (2009), and Bertoletti et al. (2008) for recent contributions and the references therein) and in the presence of search costs (Janssen and Moraga-González (2004) , Schulz and Stahl (1996) ). In contrast,
we explicitly assume a homogeneous good and perfect information of all agents, and focus solely on the two-sidedness of the market to explain price-increasing competition.
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The Monopoly Model
Consider a two-sided market for a consumption good that is offered in combination with advertising. To foster intuition and readability, we will label customers on the one market side "consumers" and customers on the other market side "advertisers". In this section, we assume that the market is served by a monopolistic platform operator. Similar to Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006) , we assume that consumers are homogeneous, except for their preference for the good (say e.g. "movie theater experience"). Let the individual net utility function be additive-separable and given by
where p c is the price for one unit of the consumption good, while θ is the taste parameter or marginal willingness to pay, q c is the quantity, and α is a parameter for the influence of advertising quantity n a on the individual's utility. Heterogeneous preferences for the good are reflected by θ, which is assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval [0, θ ], where θ > 0 determines the market size for the considered goods market. We limit q c to the values 0 and 1, so that the individual's decision problem is reduced to whether or not to consume a single unit of the good (e.g. whether to go to the movies or not). Obviously, an individual demands the good, if its net utility of doing so is greater than the net utility of refraining from consumption, that is if
as the aggregated consumer demand function on the market. Similar to Armstrong (2006) , firms are assumed to generate constant net profits from advertising. For simplicity, we assume advertisements to be standardized, so that firms only decide whether or not to place an advertisement. Therefore a single firm's advertising demand q a is either 0 or 1. The firm's net profit is given by
where n c is the number of consumers, p a is the per-contact advertising price, so that the firm has to pay p a ·n c to place an advertisement. µ is the parameter that describes the gross benefit of advertising. Firms are assumed to be heterogeneous with respect to µ, and µ is assumed to be uniformly distributed on [0,
, with µ > 0 determines the size 6 of the advertising market. Note that the net profit to be gained from advertising and therefore the size of the advertising market depends on consumer demand. The economic intuition is straightforward: The higher the demand for the good, the more consumers will be exposed to the advertisement, the more profitable advertising becomes to a firm. Firms are willing to advertise, if their net profit from doing so is positive, that is if
Hence, total advertising demand is given by
This specific functional form assures that n a (p a ,0) = 0, which implies that there is no demand for advertising if consumer demand is equal to zero.
Solving equations (2) and (4) for p c and p a yields the inverse demand functions. We assume fixed and variable costs to be zero and capacity constraints to be non-binding. Thus, the monopolist's optimization problem is 
yields plausible solutions. For ad-neutral consumers (α = 0), 2 0 < µ < is required and in case consumers are ad-likers (α < 0), the model yields plausible results for ( ) (
A Model of Duopolistic Competition
In this section, we develop a model of duopolistic competition in order to identify competitive effects on the market that has been presented in the former section. Since our paper focuses on the comparison of monopoly and duopoly markets, all assumptions of Section 2 remain, except that we now assume the market to be served by two identical platforms, denoted
The consumption good offered by both platforms is assumed to be perfectly homogenous (e.g.
two multiplexes offering the same menu of movies in direct proximity). Just like the monopolist, the duopolists are assumed to produce without variable and fixed costs.
Consumers are assumed to be the same utility-maximizing individuals they were in the previous section. Additionally, we assume that consumers are required to single-home, that is, if they join, they will have to decide for one and only one platform to join (e.g. a moviegoer
can only be in one cinema at the same time) 3 . Obviously, consumers will prefer the platform that offers most net utility. If consumers' net utility is equal on both platforms, aggregate demand is assumed to be equally shared among the two operators. Thus, using equation (1) for q c = 1 and equation (2), the consumer demand function platform operator i faces is
consumer demand of the corresponding platform. In other words, platform i's advertising demand does not directly depend on platform j's behavior. 4 Using equation (4), advertising demand of platform i is therefore given by
which is analog to Section 2.
We assume that both platforms compete in a 
so that n a s can be expressed as
Therefore, for any given p c s and p a s , firm i's profit in the symmetry case is Proof: Equation (10) implies that n c i (.) = 0, which means that demand for platform i is taking the value zero as all consumers will decide to use the rival platform j. In addition, using equation (11) ). Then, it is always profit-maximizing to charge the monopoly advertising price.
Proof: Since both platforms offer equal consumer utility, we know that Therefore, operator i's (constrained) maximization problem is 
As long as (19) is satisfied, rival platform j's consumer demand is equal to zero, which implies that j's advertising demand is also zero. Therefore, we assume that consumers anticipate that n a j* = 0, so that (19) simplifies to
The corresponding (Kuhn-Tucker-) optimization problem for operator i can be expressed as Using n a i/high* as well as equations (20) and (22) Proposition 4 states that the duopoly model only yields equilibrium solutions for the case of ad-averse consumers, while there are no equilibria in the cases of ad-neutrality and ad-liking.
This outcome corresponds to economic intuition. If consumers are ad-averse, the deviating platform gains from two specific economic effects: By offering more net-utility, the firm is able to exploit the whole consumer demand, instead of equally sharing the market. In addition, a higher number of consumers on this platform shifts the advertising demand function, resulting in a higher level of advertising. Thus, the deviating platform is able to generate a higher profit. However, ad-averse consumers are facing a disutility from advertising, which implies that the higher advertising level in turn shifts the aggregate consumer demand function on the market downwards. This effect makes deviation less profitable.
In the case of ad-neutrality, a deviating firm still gains from serving the whole consumer demand and the resulting enhancing effect on advertising demand, while there is no ad disutility for consumers and, consequently, no negative effect on consumer demand.
Therefore, the profit from deviation is, ceteris paribus, higher than in the case of ad-aversion, making deviation more likely to occur. This also holds for ad-liking consumers, where deviation is even more profitable, because higher advertising levels increase consumers' willingness to pay. Obviously, the deviation profit for 0 < α and 0 = α is higher than in the case of ad-aversion ( )
, which intuitively underpins our finding that there are no equilibria in these cases.
Analysis of the Model
In the previous sections we developed a competitive bottleneck two-sided market model and determined the monopolist's optimum as well as the duopoly equilibria. In this section we are 14 going to study these outcomes more deeply. We will specifically focus on the comparison of monopoly and duopoly in terms of prices, quantities, and welfare. Furthermore, we will focus rather on those cases that are counterintuitive or contrary to common economic knowledge from traditional one-sided markets, i.e. cases in which equilibrium duopoly prices equal or even exceed optimal monopoly prices.
Since there are no equilibria in the cases of ad-neutrality and ad-liking, we strictly focus further analysis on the case of ad-averse consumers, where a continuum of equilibrium consumer prices exists. We assume that both platform operators select the equilibrium solution that generates the highest consumer price. 7 Thus, the resulting equilibrium strategy is ( )
The corresponding equilibrium is therefore characterized by (17) and (24), yielding 
8,9
Prices and Quantities
To see if there exist parameter tuples ( µ , α ) given which duopoly prices equalize or exceed monopoly prices, we first remember that by Proposition 2 the duopoly advertising price in equilibrium equals the monopoly advertising price. The intuition of this result follows the standard argument of Armstrong (2006) , who argues that on a competitive bottleneck two- 7 The qualitative results and conclusions of the following sections do not depend on the selected equilibrium as it can be shown that all results also hold for the equilibrium strategy ( )
, which implies that both operators charge the lowest possible consumer price (see Appendix 3). 8 R l , l = 1,...,n, denotes the l-th real-valued polynomial root in ascending order of the corresponding polynomial of degree n. 9 Since θ already turned out to be a nonnegative scaling factor only, we will suppress it in the notation, that is, we will give tuples ( µ , α ) only.
15 sided market each platform is a monopolist towards the multi-homing market side, because a specific agent on the single-homing side can only be reached by joining the platform this agent chose. Our analysis therefore needs to focus on consumer prices only. Using (7) and (24), the parameter sets we are interested in solve These parameter sets can be expressed as
, where
, and δ = R 3 of 32
Cases with consumer prices being equal in monopoly and duopoly are those cases satisfying (28) with equality. These cases are given by the lower bounds of µ in (29) that is if
, and the result is a subsidization solution 10 . For γ > α ,
, and there is no subsidization. In all these cases, there is no observable price effect of competition. To gain deeper insight into the economics of this phenomenon, we evaluate demands and profits at any of these ( µ , α ) and
, and
Remember that n a * is advertising quantity per duopolist, hence 2·n a * is total advertising on the
describes a situation, in which the mere fact that the market is served by two identical firms instead of one, causes an increase in total consumer demand. While in the traditional one-sided world, increases in total consumer demand stem from the fact that duopolistic competition yields lower prices, the situation described here is more complex, because there is no observable price effect of competition.
The reason for the enhancement in total consumer demand is the two-sidedness of the market or more precisely, the effect of a decreasing amount of advertising per platform on consumer utility. To illustrate the economics of this case, we do the following gedankenexperiment:
Starting from some monopolistic optimum n c M > 0, n a M > 0, we imagine that -all else equal-10 The special case ( ) ( )
, which is discussed in Appendix 3, is also a subsidization solution. the monopolist is replaced by two identical, but independent platforms. In this case, total consumer demand n c M will be equally divided among the two platforms. As a consequence, advertising with one platform only reaches half of the consumers, which will reduce advertising demand per platform to some n a n < n a M . Since we assumed α > 0, the decrease in advertising exposure increases the willingness to pay of each consumer by an amount equal to ( ) n a M a n n − α . Since the willingness to pay of each consumer increases, the demand function shifts to the outside. If both platforms colluded, they would exploit this additional willingness to pay by setting a higher price (see Appendix 2). Since there is no observable price effect in either direction, there must be a countervailing effect -the unobservable price effect of platform competition, which in this case just compensates the price increasing effect of increased willingness to pay. Therefore, prices remain equal, but total consumer demand increases to some quantity n c n > n c M .
Price-increasing competition occurs, if (28) is satisfied with strict inequality. The corresponding parameter sets are subsets of (29), i.e.
As is the case of price equality, there are subsidization solutions and solutions with positive prices. However, it is now also possible that the monopolist charges negative consumer prices, while the duopolists do not. In the case of subsidization, less negative prices in duopoly can be interpreted as a lower subsidization of consumers as compared to monopoly.
In case of price-increasing competition, the effect of platform competition does not fully compensate the effect of demand-enhancement. Therefore, the relationships of quantities are less straightforward and partly ambiguous without further refinement of the parameter sets.
Before doing so, let us first note some results that hold for the whole case of price-increasing competition: Evaluated at any of the corresponding ( µ , α α ), we see that
and M a a n n < * , which is so far consistent with the results obtained for price equality. There is a competitive effect on profits, because despite of the price increase, industry wide profits are lower in duopoly than in monopoly. Furthermore, advertising demand per platform is lower in duopoly than in monopoly. However, because of the negative effect of consumer price on consumer demand, the demand-enhancing effect of lower advertising that shifts the consumer demand function to the outside is partially compensated by the price increase, which corresponds to a move along the (shifted) demand function, ( * c n ⋛ M c n ), and total advertising quantity does not necessarily exceed the monopoly level ( * 2 a n ⋅ ⋛ M a n ).
Parameter sets contained in n and M a n and * 2 a n ⋅ are ambiguous in this case. The same holds for the mixed cases, in which the monopolist will subsidize while the duopolists will not, which are described by
Only in case of positive prices, the relationships of quantities are unambiguous and equal to the results in case of price equality, i.e. 
Welfare
To complete our analysis, we will study the welfare effects imposed by our model. Since we assumed zero costs of production, monopoly profit and the sum of both providers' profits is equal to producer surplus. Traditional "consumer surplus" here is the sum of the surpluses created on both market sides. In the monopoly case, the market side we labeled "consumers" realizes a benefit of ( ) ( ) p is the inverse of (4) in the monopoly case, and is the inverse of (12).
Welfare is given by the sum of producer, consumer, and advertiser surplus. Table 2 summarizes the relation of total welfare in monopoly optimum and duopoly equilibrium as well as the relations of the individual welfare components.
Case Consumer Surplus
Advertiser Surplus
Left hand side = duopoly equilibrium; right hand side = monopoly optimum Table 2 : Comparison of welfare effects for ad-averse consumers.
From Table 2 we see that clear-cut welfare predictions can only be made, if no subsidization takes place. In this case, total welfare can unambiguously be improved by adding a second homogeneous platform to the industry or by permitting platform merger, even if consumer prices in duopoly are higher than in monopoly. The decrease of total producer surplus due to duopolistic competition is overcompensated by the increased consumer welfare stemming from lower advertising levels per platform, and the increased advertiser surplus, because in total more consumers can be reached.
Numerical Examples
In this section we illustrate the economics of our model using numerical examples and graphical representations. We start by presenting a case, which yields results that fit economic intuition from oligopolistic competition (Example I). Example II shows a situation in which the upper bound of the equilibria is equal to the monopoly price, representing the case of price equality from the previous section. Example III represents the case of price-increasing competition. . The economic intuition is that consumers singlehome, and are therefore exposed to the advertising quantity of one platform only, which is lower in duopoly than in monopoly n a * = 0.676 < n a M = 1.064 ( ) . Hence, the disutility due to the negative externality is lower in duopoly, which yields the demand-enhancing effect of lower market concentration. 
Example I: Intuitive price effect of competition
From
Conclusion and Implications
The results of the above analysis have implications on multiple fields of economic research.
Keep in mind that we are studying a competitive bottleneck two-sided private goods market with perfect information, and that the analysis of our model is focused on those parameter sets that are economically plausible and yield price effects contrary to economic intuition from one-sided markets, namely duopoly equilibrium prices being at least as high as monopoly prices. Furthermore it turned out that an equilibrium solution requires ad-averse consumers that is a negative impact of demand from the multi-homing market side to the single-homing one.
As summarized in Table 1 , there are cases in which total consumer demand in the duopoly equilibrium exceeds consumer demand in the monopoly optimum. On first sight, this result does not seem too surprising as it is a well-known relationship and a reason to foster competition. On second thought, the reason for higher equilibrium consumer demand in textbook oligopoly models is that oligopolistic competition yields lower consumer prices than under monopoly, and therefore demand increases. In our analysis, we explicitly study cases in which prices are equal in monopoly and duopoly. Hence, the two-sidedness of the market holds a demand-enhancing effect, caused by the mere fact that total consumer demand is now equally split between two platforms instead of being served by one platform only.
The two-sidedness of the market also contributes an alternative explanation for a missing price effect of competition. On one-sided markets, there are broadly speaking two explanations for missing price effects: Either the monopolist does not or cannot make use of her monopoly power for some reason or the oligopolists collude implicitly or explicitly. On two-sided markets, there might just be no price effect of competition. As Table 1 suggests, there is a competitive effect that causes total profits in the duopoly equilibrium to be strictly lower than in the monopoly case, and total advertising demand to be lower in monopoly than in duopoly. We neither restrict the monopolist's optimization problem artificially nor do we hinder competition between the duopolists. Still and regardless of competition taking place, there is no observable price effect or competition even increases prices given any of the parameter sets described by (29).
A price effect of competition, however, is the underlying assumption of empirical priceconcentration studies. These studies presume that prices increase with the concentration of the market, and try to estimate the magnitude of this effect. Our results suggest that this relationship might be negative, given certain exogenous conditions. Therefore, empirical analyses yielding a negative price-concentration effect do not necessarily suffer from methodological or technological mistakes. Furthermore, if conditions are such that there is no observable price effect of competition, then there is obviously no price-concentration effect that could be measured. This implies that the absence of significant empirical results cannot be interpreted as lack of competition. In this light, it is also not sensible to study the sum of the prices, which the two-sided market literature usually calls the "price level", as compared to "price balance", which describes the allocation of the price level between the two market sides.
Regarding the welfare effects of competition, we obtain ambiguous results and need to distinguish our conclusions as in Table 2 . In case of positive prices, i.e. in case of prices above marginal cost, total welfare is always higher in duopoly than in monopoly, even though consumer prices might be lower in monopoly. In case of subsidization, this is not necessarily true. Therefore, policy makers as well as regulators aiming at welfare maximization will have to obtain in-dept knowledge of the environment (in the terminology of our model: "the parameter set") they are facing before being able to act optimally. A brief glance at the prevailing price level or price balance will not suffice to make a sensible judgment. Unlike on common one-sided markets, fostering competition will not necessarily increase welfare.
Similarly, merger control becomes more difficult. Under conditions of positive prices, mergers generally have a negative impact on total welfare. Under conditions of subsidized consumer prices, we cannot draw general conclusions. If, for some exogenous reason, a merger has to take place anyway, it will virtually always imply that one platform closes down (proof: see Appendix 2). This is in line with the regulator's objective of welfare maximization, because welfare increases, if the operator of the two merged platforms closes down one of them. It even holds for distributive objectives, i.e. consumer surplus, advertiser surplus, and producer surplus all increase, if the operator closes down one platform in case of a merger (see also Appendix 2).
